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ADAM AND STEVE AND EVE: WHY SEXUALITY
SEGREGATION IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IN
VIRGINIA IS NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE
High infertility rates among Americans' and the increasing
number of people who desire to have children without participating in
heterosexual intercourse have created a surge in demand for, and
use of, artificial reproductive technologies (ART) and assisted
conception strategies.2 Protection of individuals' uses of these
technologies flows from the substantive due process component of
the Fourteenth Amendment.3 A Virginia statute, however, limits
the enforceability of surrogacy contracts based on the marital status
of prospective parents.4 This statute impinges upon the liberty of
homosexuals to pursue reproductive autonomy through ART. 5
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas6
invalidates the Virginia law restricting access to surrogacy based
on sexual orientation as violative of constitutional principles.
1. See Helen M. Alvar6, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A
Children's Rights Perspective, 40 HARVARD J. ON LEGIS. 1, 7 (2003) (describing a report
by the American Society of Reproductive Medicine that an estimated ten percent of
Americans, roughly six million people, of "reproductive age (ages fifteen to forty-five)"
suffer from infertility). See also Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational
Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 107 n.1 (citing the same report).
2. See Baum, supra note 1, at 107 n.2 (citing generally to REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY,
SURGERY, AND TECHNOLOGY (Eli Y. Adashi et al. eds., 1996), which explains that
reproductive technologies are "treatments or procedures that involve physical or
pharmacological augmentation of the procreative process. They involve controlled
ovarian hyperstimulation, artificial insemination (Al), in vitro fertilization (IVF),
gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), and other
emerging techniques, including the reimplantation of ovaries to postmenopausal women").
3. See discussion infra pp. 307-12.
4. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie 2003).
5. See Justyn Lezin, Note, (Mis)Conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried
Women's Access to Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 189 (2003) (discussing the effects of sexuality discrimination in ART
legislation on lesbians and single women). 'Where married women are free to consent to
using methods most likely to result in conception, legally unmarried women, through a
combination of excessive physician discretion and lack of legal protections, are frequently
barred from choosing their preferred options for conception." Id.
6. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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HYPOTHETICAL - IT'S A FAMILY AFFAIR
Emmett and Bryan' have been living together in a committed
homosexual relationship for ten years. They are both residents
of Virginia and work in large law firms in Washington, D.C.
Three years after their commitment ceremony, Emmett and
Bryan started thinking about having children. A friend of
Emmett's sister, Emily, volunteered to receive Bryan's sperm
through artificial insemination and deliver the resulting child to
the couple, relinquishing her parental rights. Emily was
married with two children of her own and said she wanted to
help Emmett and Bryan create a family that would bring them
as much joy as her own family brought to her.
Thrilled about finding a surrogate mother, Emmett and
Bryan asked their attorney to draw up a surrogacy contract
that complied as nearly as possible with Virginia law. The
attorney arranged the appropriate home studies as well as
the necessary physical and psychological screenings of Emmett,
Bryan, Emily, and her husband in accordance with a Virginia
statutory requirement.' All four parties signed the surrogacy
contract; however, the circuit court refused to approve the contract
because Emmett and Bryan did not fit the definition of "intended
parents" set forth in the statute.9
Emily agreed to go forward with the surrogacy arrangement
regardless of the court's refusal, and she became pregnant in
February. When she gave birth to a boy in November, however,
7. Emmett and Bryan are a fictional couple. Any resemblance they bear to individuals
or other fictional characters is purely coincidental. The author chose to create this particular
couple because they allow for the simplest exposition of the issues addressed in this paper. By
no means is this note intended to suggest that only male homosexual couples face this problem.
In fact, it is quite easily conceivable that two infertile women in a committed lesbian
relationship could present the same circumstances, face the same issues, and make the same
arguments that this paper will make on behalf of Emmett and Bryan.
8. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (Michie 2003) (requiring that "a local department of
social services or welfare or a licensed child-placing agency has conducted a home study of
the intended parents, the surrogate, and her husband" and that "[p]rior to signing
the surrogacy contract, the intended parents, the surrogate, and her husband have
submitted to physical examinations and psychological evaluations by practitioners licensed
to perform such services").
9. Id. § 20-156. The statute defines "intended parents" as
a man and a woman, married to each other, who enter into an agreement
with a surrogate under the terms of which they will be the parents of any
child born to the surrogate through assisted conception regardless of the
genetic relationships between the intended parents, the surrogate, and
the child.
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Emily changed her mind, deciding that she could not give the
child to Emmett and Bryan.1" Devastated but realizing that
Emily's decision was a legal one,1 Bryan brought suit in federal court
against the Commonwealth of Virginia.12 Bryan claims that
Virginia's surrogacy statutes precluded him from the category
of "intended parent"13 based on his sexuality and violated his
constitutional right to reproductive autonomy under the doctrine
of substantive due process and the Equal Protection Clause.
DECIDING THE CASE
The Statutes at Issue
In response to the problem of infertility, state legislatures
have implemented laws and policies to facilitate or regulate
development and use of medical procedures that help infertile
individuals achieve parenthood by replacing or enhancing coital
reproduction. 4 Virginia's statutory policy on ART appears, on
first blush, moderately liberal, especially in comparison with
some of its sister states, such as Louisiana, which explicitly
prohibits remuneration of female gamete donors 5 and legally
nullifies all contracts for surrogate motherhood.16 Under its
laws governing anatomical gifts, Virginia exempts ova and "self-
replicating body fluids" such as sperm from its prohibition on the
"117
sale or purchase of "any natural body part for any reason ....
Additionally, the Code authorizes circuit courts to approve
surrogacy contracts that comply with statutory criteria and
specifically instructs the courts how to construe non-approved
10. See id. § 20-162(A)(3) (allowing a surrogate engaged in a non-court approved
contract to decide whether or not to "relinquish her parental rights").
11. Id. § 20-158(E) (providing for the parentage of a child born pursuant to a non-court
approved surrogacy contract:
The gestational mother is the child's mother... if (i) the surrogate is married,
(ii) her husband is a party to the surrogacy contract, and (iii) the surrogate
exercises her right to retain custody and parental rights to the resulting
child pursuant to §20-162, then the surrogate and her husband are the parents).
12. From this point forward, the argument in this note assumes, without analysis of
the issue, that Bryan has standing to bring such a suit.
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie 2003).
14. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West 2004) (mandating health
insurance coverage for the treatment of infertility other than in vitro fertilization).
15. See Baum, supra note 1, at 126 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 2003), which
specifically states, 'The sale of a human ovum ... is expressly prohibited").
16. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 2003).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (Michie 2003).
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surrogacy contracts." Closer consideration of Virginia's surrogacy
statutes, however, reveals a policy of limiting protected use of
this form of ART to heterosexual couples.' 9
Chapter nine of the Virginia Code addresses the "status of
children of assisted conception."2 ° This chapter opens with a list
of definitions, most of which contain explanations of medical
terminology and procedures; however, the article defines "intended
parents" as
a man and a woman, married to each other, who enter into an
agreement with a surrogate under the terms of which they
will be the parents of any child born to the surrogate through
assisted conception regardless of the genetic relationships
between the intended parents, the surrogate, and the child.2"
The chapter later provides for circuit court approval of surrogacy
contracts that comply with a list of constraints,2 2 including that
intended parents and the surrogate satisfy the "standards of
fitness applicable to adoptive parents '23 and that the surrogate is
married and has given birth to at least one living child.24
The law also requires that all parties have undergone physical
and psychological evaluations prior to signing the contract,25 that
"[a]t least one of the intended parents is expected to be the genetic
parent of any child resulting from the agreement, 26 and that
the surrogate's husband is a party to the contract.2 ' The Code
further recognizes that some parties may enter into contracts
for surrogacy that do not comply with the strictures set forth
in section 20-160.2" The Code instructs courts regarding the
construction of such non-approved contracts, including a provision
that the surrogate may lawfully elect to either complete the
18. See id. § 20-162.
19. See discussion of the Virginia statutes that limit the availability of ART to
individuals based on their marital status, infra pp. 296-97.
20. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165 (Michie 2003).
21. Id. § 20-156.
22. Id. § 20-160.
23. Id. § 20-160(B)(3).
24. Id. § 20-160(B)(6).
25. Id. § 20-160(B)(7).
26. Id. § 20-160(B)(9).
27. Id. § 20-160(B)(10).
28. See id. § 20-162 (setting forth instructions for a circuit court's construction of
"contracts not approved by the court").
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agreement by delivering the resulting child to the intended
parents and signing a surrogate consent form or not complete the
agreement,2 9 unequivocally retaining her parental rights so long
as she is the genetic parent of the resulting child.3 °
As in the proposed hypothetical, the Code precludes the genetic
father of a child resulting from a non- approved surrogacy contract
from parenthood in all cases when the surrogate mother is
married.31 This results from the statutory construction of a non-
approved contract, demanding that "[t]he surrogate, her husband,
if any, and the intended parents shall be parties to any such
surrogacy contract"3 2 and the blanket provision that "if (i) the
surrogate is married, (ii) her husband is party to the surrogacy
contract, and (iii) the surrogate exercises her right to retain
custody and parental rights to the resulting child pursuant to § 20-
162, then the surrogate and her husband are the parents. 3 3
Bryan's Claims Against Virginia
In effect, the Code allows circuit courts to deny homosexual
men the right to beget and raise children. Bryan's federal
case against the Commonwealth of Virginia would contain the
following claims:
(1) Virginia's statutory scheme for allocation of court approval
to surrogacy contracts inappropriately classifies prospective parents
based on their marital status, precluding legally unmarried
individuals from receiving the benefit of enforcement.3 4 This
creates a presumption that homosexual individuals in committed
relationships are per se unfit parents and violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35
29. Id. § 20-162(A)(3).
30. Id. § 20-158(D).
31. See id. § 20.162(A)(1); id. § 20-158.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-162(A)(1) (Michie 2003).
33. Id. § 20-158(E)(2).
34. Id. § 20-156 (limiting the protected class of parents to "a man and a woman,
married to each other").
35. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972) (citing Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
In applying that [Equal Protection] clause, this Court has consistently
recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the
power to treat different classes of persons in different ways. The Equal
Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to States the power
to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute
into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective
of that statute. A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
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(2) Virginia's statutory definition of "intended parents"
precludes Bryan from procuring an enforceable surrogacy contract
based on his status as a homosexual and is unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
it exhibits a "desire to harm a politically unpopular group. ' 3
(3) Virginia's statutory definition of "intended parents"
precludes Bryan from pursuing reproductive freedom and is
unconstitutional under the substantive due process doctrine of
the Fourteenth Amendment because it places a substantial
obstacle in Bryan's path of seeking to beget a child.37
(4) Virginia's scheme for interpreting non-approved contracts
violates the substantive due process doctrine of the Fourteenth
Amendment by strictly preventing Bryan from legally claiming
parenthood of a child he sired in performance of a non-approved
surrogacy contract based upon the surrogate's arbitrary decision
not to follow through with the contract."5
Equal Protection Analysis
Equal protection jurisprudence does not prohibit states
from making classifications or treating different classes of people
differently.3" Instead, it requires that the legal classifications
made by states "be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike."
Id. (quoting Royster, 253 U.S. at 415) (citations omitted).
36. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) for the proposition that some state
objectives, such as "a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group," are per se
illegitimate in terms of the rational basis test).
37. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877
(1992); see infra pp. 309-12 for a discussion of privacy rights attached to decisions whether
to bear or beget a child.
38. For a discussion of parents' protected liberty interest in the care, custody, and
control of their children, see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Quiloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
39. Daniel A. Per-Lee, Annotation, Validity, Under Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment, of Gender-Based Classifications Arising by Operation of State Law - Federal
Cases, 60 L. ED. 2d 1188, § 2 (2004).
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circumstanced shall be treated alike.' ° This 'traditional' approach
to equal protection cases calls for application of the rational basis
test - all classifications rationally related to some legitimate
state interest pass muster - and delivers significant deference
to legislative decisions.4 Supreme Court precedent, however,
delineates two additional approaches to determining a statute's
constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause:' strict scrutiny
applies to 'suspect classifications' and those classifications that
affect fundamental rights, and intermediate scrutiny applies to
'semi-suspect classifications.' A suspect classification is one from
"which there is reason to infer antipathy,' and to satisfy strict
scrutiny the state must advance a compelling interest that can be
achieved through only the means in question.' Statutes that create
classifications less suspected of concealing animus receive
intermediate scrutiny under equal protection analysis: laws
that draw distinctions by gender, for example, must serve an
"important" interest and the classification must be "substantially
related" to that interest.46
Bryan first claims that Virginia violates the Equal Protection
Clause because its definition of "intended parents" creates an
unconstitutional classification based on sexual orientation,
preventing him from procuring court approval of a surrogacy
contract.47 Sexual orientation, while not identified as a suspect
classification, bears many characteristics in common with the
paradigm class. 48 Society has historically ostracized gay men
40. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920) and explaining that the Equal Protection Clause denies "to States
[sic] the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a
statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of
that statute").
41. Per-Lee, supra note 39, § 2.
42. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629 (1996) (listing heightened scrutiny
classifications to conclude that the Colorado constitutional amendment in question did
not alter any state or local rules that protected non-suspect groups from discrimination
other than homosexuals, who it singled out to be ineligible for antidiscrimination
protection under the guise of equalizing the legal treatment of all people regardless of
sexual orientation).
43. Per-Lee, supra note 39, § 2.
44. Id. at 1191. Race serves as the paradigm suspect class. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (interpreting the standard of scrutiny
set forth in Reed, 404 U.S. at 75, in considering an Oklahoma law that provided a lower
age of majority for purposes of buying "non-alcoholic" beer for females than for males).
47. See enumeration of claims, supra pp. 297-98.
48. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683-88 (1973) (analyzing the political,
legal, and social treatment of women throughout American history and comparing that
with the treatment of racial minorities, impliedly African Americans, to determine that
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and lesbians, treating them as diseased,49 as sexual predators, 50
and as criminals."' Conservative politicians and groups continue
to stymie the gay rights movement and prevent homosexuals
from enjoying the protection of laws and a presence in public
arenas.52 Homosexuals have been the victims of hate crimes
perpetuated by individuals as well as by government organizations.'
the lower court appropriately considered a gender classification, which the state
rationally justified, under heightened scrutiny).
49. See Homosexuality, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 2001), available
at http://www.findarticles.conp/articles/mi-g2699/is_0004/ai_2699000499 (last visited
February 24, 2004). "Homosexuality was classified as a mental disorder until 1973, when
the American Psychiatric Association removed 'homosexuality' from the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders." Id.
50. See Ruthann Robson, Our Children: Kids of Queer Parents & Kids Who Are Queer:
Looking at Sexual Minority Rights from a Different Perspective, 64 ALB. L. REV. 915,
915 (2001) (citing DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTIGAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE
CHRISTIAN RIGHT 78-79 (1997), for the proposition that fundamentalist forces in the
United States portray homosexuals as sexual predators "who target children, hoping
to 'seduce them into a life of depravity and disease'"). Both authors note the "similarity
of this disease and seduction discourse to the anti-Semitic discourses associating Jews
with disease, filth, urban degeneration, and child-stealing." Id. at n.2. Professor Robson
also quotes MICHAEL BRONSKI, THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE: SEX, BACKLASH, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR GAY FREEDOM 112 (1998) ("While all studies show that physical and
sexual abuse of children is far more likely to occur within the heterosexual biological
family, the fear of the homosexual molester is persistent and powerful.").
51. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575-76 (discussing the prevalence and effects of anti-
sodomy laws, both state-propagated and Court-approved, after Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), that apply only against homosexual conduct). "The stigma this
criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial." Id. The Court found unconstitutional
a Texas law that made sodomy between people of the same sex a crime based on its
interference with the individuals' substantive due process right to privacy in the conduct
of intimate consensual behavior. Id.
52. For an example of state action intended to withhold legal protection from gays
and lesbians, see generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620, (discussing a Colorado constitutional
amendment that would prohibit any law providing protection based on homosexual,
bisexual, or transsexual status). See also Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush Backs
Amendment Banning Gay Marriage; President Says States Could Rule on Civil Unions,
WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2004, at A01 ("President Bush called yesterday for a constitutional
amendment restricting marriage to the union of men and women, asserting that gay
marriage would weaken society.").
53. See Douglas Martin, Strictly Business; Christopher St. Rebounds As a Thriving
"Gay Mecca," N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 21, 1993, at B3 (discussing the rejuvenation of Christopher
Street in Greenwich Village:
Christopher Street resembles other small retail streets in Greenwich Village,
but it became a magnet and a symbol for homosexuals after the police raided
the Stonewall Inn, at 53 Christopher Street, on June 27, 1969. That led to
the city's first gay-rights protests, and the emergence of a unified, forceful gay-
rights movement);
A Stiff and Proper Sentence, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1999, at A26 (noting that "[a]nti-gay
violence accounted for more than 1,100 reported hate crimes in this country in 1997,
according to the latest F.B.I. figures," and addressing the plea agreement made
between prosecutors and one of the defendants charged with the kidnapping and
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This history of mistreatment should guide the courts, in considering
Bryan's case, to apply heightened scrutiny when analyzing
Virginia's surrogacy statutes for equal protection violations.54
The Supreme Court stated in Frontiero v. Richardson: "[What
differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence
or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect
criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation
to ability to perform or contribute to society."55 Classification based
on sexual orientation parallels this characterization of sex, and the
same justification for considering sexuality a suspect classification
applies. The only limitations on homosexuals' "ability to perform
or contribute to society"5" come from society itself: laws, moral
traditions,' and general ignorance59 have prevented homosexuals
from living openly, raising families, and otherwise contributing
to society. Even if the classification of homosexuals does not rise
beating death of Matthew Shepard in 1998); Stephen Holden, A Rape and Beating, Later
3 Murders and Then the Twist, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 23, 1998, at E5 (reviewing The
Brandon Teena Story, a documentary film about a twenty-one year old female-to-male
transsexual who was raped, beaten, and shot by two men in Nebraska after they
discovered her gender).
54. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
55. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (citing Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1173-74 (1969)).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.1 (1986) (upholding a Georgia
statute that criminalized sodomy, defined as performance of or submission to "any sexual
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another").
58. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567-70 (making the point that, while laws addressing
sodomy did not address homosexual sodomy specifically, by outlawing any act that had
the purpose of creating sexual pleasure without the possibility of conception, these laws
have been powerful tools in condemning homosexuals and homosexuality); see also Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (stating
that the Supreme Court's "obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code").
59. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67 (restating that the Court's decision in Bowers
focused on the question "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy," and correcting the precedent: "That statement,
we now conclude, discloses the Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty
at stake").
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to the level of suspect, these statutes burden the recognized and
protected fundamental right to make reproductive choices, which
commands strict scrutiny analysis.'
Applying strict scrutiny to the classification of "intended
parents," the Court must first identify a compelling state interest
on which the Virginia legislature premised its surrogacy statutes.
6 1
Then, Virginia must prove that the interest "cannot be achieved
in other ways."6 2 The states have an established compelling
interest in protecting child welfare 3 under which Virginia will
seek defense from Bryan's equal protection challenge. Virginia,
however, must fulfill the second prong of the strict scrutiny test
by proving that its surrogacy statutes are "narrowly tailored
measures" that further the state's compelling governmental
interest." By requiring that a law's means be narrowly tailored
60. Eistenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." (emphasis in original)).
61. Per-Lee, supra note 39, § 2 (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)).
62. Id. (citing McLaughlin, 379 U.S. 184).
63. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (noting that states have "long-
recognized interests as parens patriae" against which courts must balance parents'
rights and children's own interests to determine how best to preserve the child's welfare
(citations omitted)); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-04 (1993) (citing Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982), for the establishment of a governmental interest in
"preserving and promoting the welfare of the child"); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(1984) ("The State, of course, has a duty of the highest order to protect the interests of
minor children, particularly those of tender years."); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605
(1979) ("The parens patriae interest in helping parents care for the mental health of their
children. .. ."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944) (finding:
The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like
actions of adults .... A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon
the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding
restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection.).
64. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335 (2003)
(defining the second prong of the strict scrutiny test in determining the constitutionality
of a race-based affirmative action plan at the University of Michigan: "Even in the limited
circumstance when drawing racial distinctions is permissible to further a compelling
state interest, government is still 'constrained in how it may pursue that end: [T]he
means chosen to accomplish the [government's] asserted purpose must be specifically
and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.'" (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,
908 (1996))).
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to its end, the Court ensures that a state's actions arise only to further
its compelling interest and not out of animus toward the affected
group.65 Virginia's surrogacy statutes, however, cannot pass
this test.
Although its interest in protecting the welfare of children is
sufficiently compelling, Virginia's exclusion of legally unmarried
individuals6 from the freedom to make an enforceable surrogacy
contract is far from narrowly tailored to satisfy that objective. The
State's legislated reservation of surrogacy contract enforcement to
those "intended parents" 7 who are "a man and a woman, married to
each other"6 is too broad to accomplish the objective of protecting child
welfare.69 Much like the law that the Supreme Court overturned
in Romer v. Evans, the Virginia statute singles out legally unmarried
individuals who desire to reproduce using ART and denies them the
protection of a court approved contract.70 This definition embodies
a sweeping assumption that heterosexual, legally married couples
are fit parents while homosexual, legally unmarried couples are per
se unfit,7 an assumption that both Virginia common law and
Supreme Court precedent condemn.72
65. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (quoting the plurality opinion in Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989), for the proposition that "the purpose of the narrow
tailoring requirement is to ensure that 'the means chosen "fit" the compelling goal so
closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification
was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype'").
66. See Lezin, supra note 5, at 189 n.13 (using the term
'legally unmarried women'.., interchangeably with 'lesbians and/or single
women,' recognizing that many lesbian couples see themselves as married,
even when the state has yet to reflect this reality. While the term 'single'
technically describes the legal standing of women who are not in state-
sanctioned marriages with men, it does not sufficiently match many
partnered women's identities).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie 2003).
68. Id.
69. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (considering, under the rational basis
test, an amendment to Colorado's state constitution that would deny homosexuals any
specific protection from discrimination within the state:
Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of judicial review. It is at once
too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then
denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a
class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is
unprecedented in our jurisprudence).
70. See id.
71. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie 2003) (allowing only heterosexual married
couples the opportunity to be "intended parents").
72. See discussion infra pp. 304-05.
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The Virginia Supreme Court has long held that an individual's
sexuality cannot define that person's fitness as a parent.73
Additionally, United States Supreme Court precedent counsels
against. consideration of homosexuality in determining parental
fitness.74 In 1985, the Virginia Supreme Court decided the custody
of a young girl in favor of her mother because her father's
homosexuality created living conditions that were "not only
unlawful but also impose[d] an intolerable burden upon her
by reason of the social condemnation attached to them, which
will inevitably afflict her relationships with her peers and
with the community at large."" The court failed, however, to
heed the United States Supreme Court's admonition in Palmore
v. Sidoti7" that custody decisions based on conjecture about
public reaction to one parent's unconventional relationship
violate equal protection." In deciding a 1995 custody case in
favor of the child's grandmother, the Virginia Supreme Court
considered the illegality of homosexual acts in more depth: "Conduct
inherent in lesbianism is punishable as a Class 6 felony in the
Commonwealth . . thus, that conduct is another important
consideration in determining custody."78 In 2003, however, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that laws criminalizing
homosexual sodomy are unconstitutionally violative of substantive
due process.79 The Court interpreted such statutes to "seek to
73. See generally Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736, 748 (1981) (declining "to hold that every
lesbian mother or homosexual father is per se an unfit parent").
74. See generally Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
75. Roe v. Doe, 228 Va. 722, 728 (1985).
76. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
77. Id. at 433 (citing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 260-61 (1971) (White,
J., dissenting)).
The question, however, is whether the reality of private biases and the
possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for removal
of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother. We have little
difficulty concluding that they are not. The Constitution cannot control
such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside
the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect. "Public officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may not avoid a
constitutional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of private racial
prejudice that they assume to be both widely and deeply held."
Id. (quoting Palmer, 403 U.S. at 260-61).
78. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 249 Va. 410, 419 (1995); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361
(Michie 2003) (delineating crimes against nature: "If any person carnally knows in any
manner any brute animal, or carnally knows any male or female person by the anus or
by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submits to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall
be guilty of a Class 6 felony").
79. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
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control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to
choose without being punished as criminals.""°
In addition to attacking Virginia's definition of "intended
parents" for being overly broad and creating an unlawful
classification that cannot pass strict scrutiny, Bryan claims that
the definition evinces a "desire to harm a politically unpopular
group" and automatically fails the equal protection rational basis
test for being derived from a per se illegitimate state objective. 1
The Virginia statutes mandate that court determinations of child
custody primarily focus on the best interests of the child in
question. 2 Three factors go to such a determination in cases of
homosexual parentage: "the legality of homosexual conduct,"83
the ability of the homosexual parent to be an appropriate role
model for the child,' and the "social stigma attached to
homosexuality."85 The Supreme Court determined that the first
and third inquiries violate the Constitution, 6 leaving only the
second question for discussion - whether homosexuals can be
effective role models to children."
This consideration of homosexual parents as role models
breaks down into two distinct questions: "[Clan a homosexual
parent serve the 'modeling' needs of a child who will grow up to
be a heterosexual adult?"88 and "tI]s the sexuality of a child
influenced by the sexuality of his or her parent?"" Professor
Charlotte Patterson,"° an expert witness in the Virginia Supreme
Court case Bottoms v. Bottoms, scrutinized the available social
80. Id. at 567 (stating further, "It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may
choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons").
81. See id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), for the proposition that some state objectives are per
se illegitimate in terms of the rational basis test).
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Michie 2003) ("In determining custody, the court
shall give primary consideration to the best interests of the child.").
83. See Kif Skidmore, Note, A Family Affair: Constitutional and Prudential Interests
Implicated When Homosexuals Seek to Preserve or Create Parent-Child Relationships, 89
KY. L.J. 1227, 1256-57 (2000).
84. Id. at 1257-59.
85. Id. at 1259-60.
86. See discussion of Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003), supra pp. 304-05.
87. See Skidmore, supra note 83, at 1257-59.
88. Id. at 1258.
89. Id.
90. Patterson is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Virginia. She was an
Associate Professor when she testified in Bottoms.
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science studies of American children born to lesbian or gay
parents.9 She found no evidence to support the fear that
children of lesbian or gay parents have developmental difficulties
compared to children of heterosexual parents; in fact, "they
have produced no evidence at all in support of this proposition."92
The research reveals that the widespread concern that children
of homosexual parents are likely targets of sexual abuse is
completely erroneous; in fact, the truth is quite the opposite -
children are much more likely to be sexually abused by a
heterosexual man than by any homosexual.93
The second major concern about role modeling questions
whether children of homosexual parents develop a propensity
for homosexuality based on their parents' model.9 4 This inquiry
develops out of scientific uncertainty surrounding the source
of sexuality.95 Further research, however, exposes this anxiety
as baseless: children's predilection toward heterosexuality or
homosexuality rarely evinces influence from their parents'
sexuality." Because a preponderance of research refutes the
91. Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults:
A Social Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 191 (1995).
92. Id. at 198. Patterson cites studies reported in, inter alia, Robert L. Barret &
Bryan E. Robinson, Gay Dads, in REDEFINING FAMILIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN'S
DEVELOPMENT 157, 168 (Adele E. Gottfried & Allen W. Gottfried eds., 1994) for the
proposition that "there is generally no difference in development between children of
gay parents and children of heterosexual parents" and Charlotte J. Patterson, Children
of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 1025, 1036 (1992) which concludes "that
there is no research evidence supporting the claim that children of lesbian or gay parents
develop differently than children of heterosexual parents." Id. at 197-98 n.33.
93. See Patterson, supra note 91, at 199 ("[Tihe existing research suggests that the
great majority of child sexual abuse is committed by heterosexual men, not by lesbians or gay
men."); see also Ruthann Robson, supra note 50, at 915 n.2 (quoting MICHAEL BRONSKI, THE
PLEASURE PRINCIPLE: SEX, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY FREEDOM 112 (1998),
'While all studies show that physical and sexual abuse of children is far more likely to occur
within the heterosexual biological family, the fear of the homosexual molester is persistent
and powerful").
94. See Skidmore, supra note 83, at 1259.
95. Id. (recognizing "the unsettled question whether sexual orientation is a product of
biology or environmental factors").
96. See Robson, supra note 50, at 917 n.9 (citing S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879
(Alaska 1985), "finding no evidence that an infant boy's exposure to his lesbian mother
would increase the likelihood of his becoming homosexual"); id. (citing Conkel v. Conkel,
509 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987), 'rejecting the appellant's argument that
exposing her two boys to their homosexual father may cause them to become
homosexual, and taking judicial notice that, while the causes of homosexuality are
elusive, most experts agree that it is not caused by contact with a homosexual parent");
id. (citing Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children,
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 852-56, "conceding [in her contradictory paper] that
the 'sympathetic orientation and methodological bias' of social scientific studies tending
to demonstrate that children of homosexual parents are more likely to become
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applicability of concerns about the ability of homosexual parents
to function as appropriate role models, and the Supreme Court
has deemed the other two 'best interest' calculations focusing on
homosexuality unconstitutional," Virginia has no legitimate
interest in preventing homosexuals from pursuing parenthood
through enforceable surrogacy contracts. The prohibition must,
therefore, evolve from some desire to prevent homosexuals from
this protection based on their status as homosexuals. The Supreme
Court clearly stated that statutes propagated out of such a "desire
to harm a politically unpopular group" are per se illegitimate
and patently fail under the Equal Protection Clause.98
Due Process Analysis
The Constitutional Right to Reproductive Autonomy
for Individuals
The Supreme Court has not specifically defined a right to
participate in assisted conception;99 nevertheless, the Court's
extensive discussion and successive affirmation of procreative
liberty suggests that the Constitution protects an individual's
right to use reproductive technologies to effectuate conception
as a function of that liberty.1°' Bryan's final two claims arise
out of this freedom of reproductive self-determination guaranteed
homosexual renders such studies unreliable"); id. (citing David P. Russman, Note,
Alternative Families: In Whose Best Interests?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 31, 58 (1993),
"Although some courts fear that children of gay parents will become gay themselves,
little evidence suggests that a parent's sexual orientation influences that of the child");
id. at 924 n.36 (citing Charlotte J. Patterson & Richard E. Redding, Lesbian and Gay
Families with Children: Implications of Social Science Research for Policy, 52 J.
Soc. ISSUES 29, 30 (1996), "concluding, from an overview of social science literature, that
gay and lesbian parents are as likely as heterosexual parents to provide a positive
home environment").
97. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (referring to discussion of Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), supra pp. 304-05).
98. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) ("A law declaring that in general it shall be more
difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is
itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.").
99. Lezin, supra note 5, at 197.
100. See Alexander N. Hecht, Note, The Wild, Wild West: Inadequate Regulation of
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 1 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 227, 247 (2001) (noting
that "a woman's right to use ART is deeply rooted in the United States Constitution");
see also ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 8 (1995).
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by the Fourteenth Amendment doctrine of substantive due process.
First, he claims that Virginia's statutory definition of 'ntended
parents" violates his fundamental right to reproductive autonomy
by placing a "substantial obstacle" in his path to begetting a child.1 1
Second, Bryan posits that Virginia's statutory scheme for
interpreting non-approved surrogacy contracts strictly prevents
him from parenting his biological offspring in violation of
substantive due process."0 2
The Supreme Court has protected individuals' autonomy in
reproductive decision-making in a series of cases since 1942. In
Skinner v. Oklahoma,0 3 the Court determined that an Oklahoma
law requiring the sterilization of habitual criminals "runs afoul
of the equal protection clause."10 4 The state could not articulate
a compelling interest that justified its classification of "habitual
criminals" for purposes of sterilization.' 5 Determining that
the Oklahoma statute "involves one of the basic civil rights of
man""° because "marriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race,"'0 7 the Court overturned
it for failure to pass strict scrutiny.0 8
In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court broadened the
interpretation it set forth in Skinner, deeming reproductive freedom
a fundamental human right.' The Connecticut law in question
prohibited dispensation of devices used for contraception, information
regarding contraception, and use of any such information or
devices."0 The state prosecuted a medical doctor and the Executive
Director of Planned Parenthood under this law, and the trial court
found them guilty, as accessories, for counseling married couples
101. See discussion of "substantial obstacle" test from Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914
(2000), infra p. 312; discussion ofEisenstadtv. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972), infra pp. 309-
10 (defining the fundamental liberty of reproductive freedom as "the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child") (emphasis
in original).
102. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing the "fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child").
103. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).




108. Id. (explaining that "strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a
sterilization law is essential").
109. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
110. Id. at 480.
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about how to prevent conception.' The Supreme Court's plurality
opinion drew upon precedent concerning substantive due process, 112
parents' right to make determinations about their children's
upbringing and education," 3 and freedom of association"4 to
formulate the famous 'penumbras and emanations' theory of
privacy rights.' Justice Douglas explained that the guarantees
contained in the Bill of Rights create "zones of privacy," or
penumbras, that command the same constitutional protection as
those rights explicitly set forth by the amendments themselves." 6
The plurality in Griswold determined that the privacy of the
marital relationship protects reproductive choices made within
that relationship, including the right to use contraception."'
In 1972, the Court further expanded its protection of
procreative privacy to unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt
v. Baird." Under the microscope of the Equal Protection Clause,"9
the Court examined a Massachusetts statute that criminalized
provision of "any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever
for the prevention of conception" except by registered physicians
and pharmacists to married persons. 2 ' Searching for "some
ground of difference that rationally explains the different treatment
accorded married and unmarried persons,"21 a non suspect
classification, the Court applied the rational basis test.'22
Significantly, Justice Brennan pointed out that if the Court were
to consider the statute under the doctrine of substantive due
process, as it had considered the Connecticut statute in Griswold,
111. Id.
112. Id. at 481-82 (discussing the Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), line of
cases, which defined the concept of substantive due process in terms of economic rights
before the Court abandoned such analysis, leaving the doctrine to be used almost
exclusively to justify protections under the right to privacy).
113. Id. at 482 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v. State
of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
114. Id. at 483 (discussing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and subsequent
cases construing this right).
115. Id. at 484.
116. See generally id.
117. Id. at 485-86.
118. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
119. Id. at 447.
120. Id. at 440-41 n.2.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 477 n.7.
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it would necessarily apply strict scrutiny because of the
fundamental right at issue.12 Because the Massachusetts
statute in question failed to satisfy even the rational basis test,
the Court had no need to reach the question of whether the
classification was "necessary to the achievement of a compelling
state interest" under substantive due process.'2 4 The Court found
no rational basis for the Massachusetts law, concluding,
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question
inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.'25
Affirming Reproductive Freedom & Defining Tests to Ensure
Noninterference by States
Further affirming individuals' protected fundamental right
to freedom from state interference in reproductive choices, the
Supreme Court passed down a series of decisions concerning
the constitutionality of state regulations of abortion procedures:
Roe v. Wade in 1973,126 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey in 1992,127 and Stenberg v. Carhart in
2000.128 At their core, these cases ensured that women in the
United States can engage the reproductive freedom enumerated
in the Skinner line of cases by obtaining abortion services before
the point of fetal viability, which serves as the point at which
123. Id.
Of course, if we were to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges
upon fundamental freedoms under Griswold, the statutory classification
would have to be not merely rationally related to a valid public purpose but
necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest. But just as in
Reed v. Reed ... we do not have to address the statute's validity under that
test because the law fails to satisfy even the more lenient equal
protection standard.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
124. Id. (emphasis in original).
125. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
126. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
127. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
128. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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a state's interest in the life of the unborn fetus inheres.129 On
a more complex level, the Roe line of cases defines the boundary
between individual and state interests in reproduction." 0 While
much debate over the Court's abortion decisions focuses on the
state's interest in the fetus, the most poignant result of these
decisions affirms the vested right of individuals to determine
whether and when to reproduce.
In Roe, the Court concluded that the privacy right protecting
reproductive choice extends to the decision by a woman whether to
terminate her pregnancy by procuring an abortion procedure.
13
'
A state's interest in protecting life overcomes the woman's right
to choose to terminate her pregnancy only when the fetus reaches
the point of medical viability.132 The Court further limited a state's
interest, mandating that preservation of the woman's life or health
take precedence at all points during pregnancy." 3
The Court's decision in Casey affmned Roe as an expression of
the substantive due process right to freedom of reproductive choice:
It should be recognized, moreover, that in some critical respects
the abortion decision is of the same character as the decision to
use contraception, to which Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt
v. Baird, and Carey v. Population Services International afford
constitutional protection. We have no doubt as to the correctness
of those decisions. They support the reasoning in Roe relating to
the woman's liberty because they involve personal decisions
concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also human
responsibility and respect for it.
1 4
129. See infra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
130. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 ("[Tlhe right of personal privacy includes the abortion
decision, but.., this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation.").
131. Id. at 164 (clarifying that a "state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas
type, that excepts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother,
without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests
involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment") (emphasis
in original).
132. Id. at 163-64.
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential
life, the 'compelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb.
State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical
and biological justifications.
Id. at 163.
133. Id. at 163-64 ("If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it
may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother.").
134. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852-53.
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Casey denominated the right to procure an abortion not as a
fundamental right in itself but as a necessary function of the
fundamental right to reproductive autonomy, which states may
not unduly burden without presenting a compelling interest
to which the regulation is substantially related. 3 '
Finally, in Stenberg, the Court determined that a Nebraska law
proscribing "partial birth abortion" violated women's protected
liberty interest in two ways.'36 First, it did not contain an exception
for circumstances of medical necessity to save the life of the
pregnant woman,"' and second, it had the "effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of
a nonviable fetus."'3 8 Logically, if the right to choose an abortion is
a function of the right to reproductive autonomy, then other
functions of that right will enjoy the same protections that abortion
receives. Therefore, because the pursuit of conception through non-
coital means is a function of reproductive autonomy,139 the Virginia
laws that place a "substantial obstacle in the path"40 of an individual
seeking assisted reproduction are unconstitutional.
Natural Parents' Constitutional Right to Care, Custody, and
Control Over Their Children
Bryan's fourth claim presents the most difficult case under
Supreme Court precedent because, while the fundamental right
vested in parents to care, custody, and control over their natural
children has a long history of recognition,' the Court decided
135. See id. at 877 (establishing that a statute that places an undue burden on the
fundamental right to reproductive freedom - in this case a woman's right to procure
the abortion of a non-viable fetus - places a "substantial obstacle in the path" to
expression of that right and is categorically violative of the Constitution and, therefore,
invalid. "[The means chosen by the State ... must be calculated to inform the woman's
free choice, not hinder it").
136. See generally Sternberg, 530 U.S. 914.
137. Id. at 938.
138. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877) (emphasis added).
139. For Supreme Court discussion of reproduction as a major life activity worthy of
significant protection, see Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (considering
whether reproduction and childbearing are major life activities from which an HIV-
positive woman was limited based on her inability to expect to reproduce healthy offspring
and determining, with "little difficulty," that reproduction fulfills the Americans with
Disabilities Act requirement that a major life activity of an individual be limited in order
for the individual to be considered 'disabled).
140. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).
141. For a list of cases recognizing this fundamental right, see supra note 38.
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a case with facts similar to Bryan's against the biological father
in 1989.142 In Michael H. v. Gerald D., Michael sired a child,
Victoria, in an adulterous relationship with Gerald's wife.143
A California law created a presumption that the child of a married
woman was born of the marriage so long as the woman was
cohabiting with her husband and her husband was not sterile
or impotent during the requisite time period.144 Similarly,
Virginia's law presents a presumption under non-approved
surrogacy contracts that the surrogate's husband is the father
of any resulting child if the surrogate chooses not to fulfill her
promise to relinquish custody to the intended parents. 45 The
Supreme Court explained that irrebuttable presumptions call for
equal protection rather than procedural due process analysis,
and the Justices considered Michael's substantive claim to
protection under the law, finding that the statute's classification
rationally furthered the state's legitimate interest in protecting
the marital family.'46 The Court explained that liberty interests
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment must be both
"fundamental" and "traditionally protected by our society,"'
147
reducing the legal issue in question to "whether the relationship
between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria has
been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices
of our society, or whether on any other basis it has been accorded
special protection.' 4 8
Applying the Court's analysis in Michael H. to Bryan's case,
the legal issue reduces to whether society has historically accorded
protection to the kind of relationship Bryan shares with his
biological son. 49 Virginia has, in fact, protected this type of
relationship for more than a decade by allowing court approval
142. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
143. Id. at 113.
144. See id. at 115 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 621(a) (West Supp. 1989), establishing
that "the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile,
is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage").
145. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(E)(2) (Michie 2001).
146. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121.
147. Id. at 122.
148. Id. at 124.
149. See id.
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of surrogacy contracts. 5 ' If not for Virginia's unconstitutional
classification of "intended parents" as "a man and a woman,
married to each other," '' Bryan would receive this protection like
all heterosexual, legally married biological fathers who can
pursue a court-approved surrogacy contract. 1 52 As applied by
the Virginia circuit court that refused to approve Bryan's contract
with Emily, the statutes unconstitutionally preclude Bryan
from achieving an enforceable contract based on his sexuality.
153
The statutes also deny Bryan recognition as the parent of his
biological son in violation of his fundamental right to the care,
custody, and control of his biological child.15 4
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Because it inappropriately classifies intended parents based
on sexuality and marital status, Virginia's scheme for approving
and enforcing surrogacy agreements violates the constitutional
mandate that states shall accord equal protection of the laws to
all people in their jurisdiction and that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
the law."' 55 Virginia need only amend one portion of Title 20 in
order to overcome these constitutional violations. The legislature
should amend the definition of "intended parents" in section 20-
156 to read: "Intended parent means an individual who enters
into an agreement with a surrogate under the terms of which
that individual will be the parent of any child born to the surrogate
through assisted conception regardless of the genetic relationships
between the intended parent, the surrogate, and the child."
1 56
150. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159 (Michie 2001), stating:
A surrogate, her husband, if any, and prospective intended parents may
enter into a written agreement whereby the surrogate may relinquish all
her rights and duties as parent of a child conceived through assisted
conception, and the intended parents may become the parents of the child ....
Surrogacy contracts shall be approved by the court as provided in § 20-160.
The legislature initially enacted this statute in 1991.
151. Id. § 20-156.
152. See id. § 20-158(D) (concerning "[b]irth pursuant to [a] court approved surrogacy
contract .... After approval of a surrogacy contract by the court and entry of an order...
the intended parents are the parents of any resulting child").
153. See id. §20-45.2 ("A marriage between persons of the same sex is prohibited.").
154. See id, § 20-158(E)(2).
155. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
156. But see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie 2001).
Intended parents means a man and a woman, married to each other, who
enter into an agreement with a surrogate under the terms of which they will
be the parents of any child born to the surrogate through assisted conception
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This would overcome the equal protection problems presented
by Bryan's case, allowing him to procure an enforceable court-
approved surrogacy contract through the circuit court regardless
of his status as a legally unmarried homosexual.'57 This change
would also solve the substantive due process problems presented
by Bryan's claims against Title 20 by allowing people in Bryan's
position to procure approved surrogacy contracts. The availability
of enforceable contracts would eradicate the problem of unapproved
contracts being the only avenue for homosexuals to pursue
surrogacy arrangements. Thus, a court could construe the
irrebuttable presumption embodied in the statute determining
the parentage of children born pursuant to such unapproved
contracts to rationally advance the state's legitimate interest
in protecting the marital family, 5 ' and no longer to further
the objective of denying parenthood from homosexuals, a patently
illegitimate objective.
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regardless of the genetic relationships between the intended parents, the
surrogate, and the child.
Id.
157. See discussion of the statute's equal protection violations, supra pp. 298-307.
158. See discussion of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), supra pp. 312-14.
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